"The belief-bias effect
One of the key methods for demonstrating dual processes in reasoning tasks involves the so-called ‘belief bias’ effect. The methodology introduced by Evans et al. seeks to create a conflict between responses based upon a process of logical reasoning and those derived from prior belief about the truth of conclusions. Typically, syllogisms are presented for evaluation, which fall into one of the four following categories:
(1) Valid argument, believable conclusion (NO CONFLICT)
Example:
No police dogs are vicious
Some highly trained dogs are vicious
Therefore, some highly trained dogs are not police dogs
(2) Valid argument, unbelievable conclusion (CONFLICT)
Example:
No nutritional things are inexpensive
Some vitamin tablets are inexpensive
Therefore, some vitamin tablets are not nutritional
(3) Invalid argument, believable conclusion (CONFLICT)
Example:
No addictive things are inexpensive
Some cigarettes are inexpensive
Therefore, some addictive things are not cigarettes
(4) Invalid argument, unbelievable conclusion (NO CONFLICT)
Example:
No millionaires are hard workers
Some rich people are hard workers
Therefore, some millionaires are not rich people
In belief-bias experiments, participants are instructed to treat the problem as a logical reasoning task and to endorse only conclusions that necessarily follow from the premises given. In spite of this, intelligent adult populations (undergraduate students) are consistently influenced by the prior believability of the conclusion given as well as by the validity of the arguments presented. The conclusion endorsement rates from the study of Evans et al. are shown in Figure I. It is clear that participants are substantially influenced by both the logic of the argument and believability of its conclusion, with more belief-bias on invalid arguments. Dual-process accounts propose that although participants attempt to reason logically in accord with the instructions, the influence of prior beliefs is extremely difficult to suppress and effectively competes for control of the responses made.
© Jonathan St.B.T. Evans
"In Two Minds: Dual-process Accounts of Reasoning" (2003)
[link]
One of the key methods for demonstrating dual processes in reasoning tasks involves the so-called ‘belief bias’ effect. The methodology introduced by Evans et al. seeks to create a conflict between responses based upon a process of logical reasoning and those derived from prior belief about the truth of conclusions. Typically, syllogisms are presented for evaluation, which fall into one of the four following categories:
(1) Valid argument, believable conclusion (NO CONFLICT)
Example:
No police dogs are vicious
Some highly trained dogs are vicious
Therefore, some highly trained dogs are not police dogs
(2) Valid argument, unbelievable conclusion (CONFLICT)
Example:
No nutritional things are inexpensive
Some vitamin tablets are inexpensive
Therefore, some vitamin tablets are not nutritional
(3) Invalid argument, believable conclusion (CONFLICT)
Example:
No addictive things are inexpensive
Some cigarettes are inexpensive
Therefore, some addictive things are not cigarettes
(4) Invalid argument, unbelievable conclusion (NO CONFLICT)
Example:
No millionaires are hard workers
Some rich people are hard workers
Therefore, some millionaires are not rich people
In belief-bias experiments, participants are instructed to treat the problem as a logical reasoning task and to endorse only conclusions that necessarily follow from the premises given. In spite of this, intelligent adult populations (undergraduate students) are consistently influenced by the prior believability of the conclusion given as well as by the validity of the arguments presented. The conclusion endorsement rates from the study of Evans et al. are shown in Figure I. It is clear that participants are substantially influenced by both the logic of the argument and believability of its conclusion, with more belief-bias on invalid arguments. Dual-process accounts propose that although participants attempt to reason logically in accord with the instructions, the influence of prior beliefs is extremely difficult to suppress and effectively competes for control of the responses made.
Figure I. The belief-bias effect in syllogistic reasoning, showing conclusions accepted as a function of both the validity of the syllogism (x-axis) and the believability of its conclusion (green ? believable; red ? unbelievable)."
© Jonathan St.B.T. Evans
"In Two Minds: Dual-process Accounts of Reasoning" (2003)
[link]
No comments:
Post a Comment