"Researchers in thinking and reasoning have proposed recently that there are two distinct cognitive systems underlying reasoning.
System 1 is old in evolutionary terms and shared with other animals: it comprises a set of autonomous subsystems that include both innate input modules and domain-specific knowledge acquired by a domain-general learning mechanism.
System 2 is evolutionarily recent and distinctively human: it permits abstract reasoning and hypothetical thinking, but is constrained by working memory capacity and correlated with measures of general intelligence. These theories essentially posit two minds in one brain with a range of experimental psychological evidence showing that the two systems compete for control of our inferences and actions.
(...)
System 1 is generally described as a form of universal cognition shared between humans and animals. It is actually not really a single system, but a set of sub-systems that operate with some autonomy. System 1 includes instinctive behaviours that are innately programmed, and would include any innate input modules of the kind proposed by Fodor which are not be confused with more questionable recent claims for domain-encapsulated innate modules that control specific behaviours. The System 1 processes that are most often described, however, are those that are formed by associative learning processes of the kind produced by neural networks. The autonomy of such systems reflects the domain-specific nature of the learning, even though the learning mechanism itself is domain-general. Dual-process theorists generally agree that System 1 processes are rapid, parallel and automatic in nature: only their final product is posted in consciousness. There is at least one contemporary research programme in which researchers are attempting to account for all reasoning results in terms of System 1 level processes. However, I shall provide substantial evidence that postulation of a second system is required.
System 2 is believed to have evolved much more recently and is thought by most theorists to be uniquely human. System 2 thinking is slow and sequential in nature and makes use of the central working memory system that has been so intensively studied in the psychology of memory. Despite its limited capacity and slower speed of operation, System 2 permits abstract hypothetical thinking that cannot be achieved by System 1. Consider the case of decision-making. We might (and frequently do) decide our actions on the basis of past experience, doing what has worked well in the past. Such intuitive decisions require little reflection. However, we can also make decisions by constructing mental models or simulations of future possibilities, a process that I term ‘hypothetical thinking’. This distinctively human facility – provided by System 2 – is of great importance.We cannot, for example, learn by experience to avoid disasters such as nuclear war or the effects of uncontrolled global warming.
(...)
Dual-process theorists claim that human beings evolved a powerful general purpose reasoning system – System 2 – at quite a late stage, and this co-exists with a much older set of autonomous sub-systems labelled as System 1. There is evidence in the archaeological record that lends credibility to this claim. In commenting on the remarkable competitive success of Homo Sapiens Sapiens over other hominids, Mithen stated, ‘This persuades many archaeologists that modern humans had…a cognitive advantage which may have resided in a more complex form of language or a quite different type of mentality… Support for the latter is readily evident in from dramatic developments that occur in the archaeological record relating to new ways of thinking and behaving by modern humans.’ (Mithen, S. (2002) "In The Cognitive Basis of Science", p. 33). Mithen comments on the qualitative change in the archaeological record c.50,000 years ago when there was sudden evidence of representational art, religious imagery and rapid adaptations in the design of tools and artefacts."
© Jonathan St.B.T. Evans
"In Two Minds: Dual-process Accounts of Reasoning" (2003)
[link]
System 1 is old in evolutionary terms and shared with other animals: it comprises a set of autonomous subsystems that include both innate input modules and domain-specific knowledge acquired by a domain-general learning mechanism.
System 2 is evolutionarily recent and distinctively human: it permits abstract reasoning and hypothetical thinking, but is constrained by working memory capacity and correlated with measures of general intelligence. These theories essentially posit two minds in one brain with a range of experimental psychological evidence showing that the two systems compete for control of our inferences and actions.
(...)
System 1 is generally described as a form of universal cognition shared between humans and animals. It is actually not really a single system, but a set of sub-systems that operate with some autonomy. System 1 includes instinctive behaviours that are innately programmed, and would include any innate input modules of the kind proposed by Fodor which are not be confused with more questionable recent claims for domain-encapsulated innate modules that control specific behaviours. The System 1 processes that are most often described, however, are those that are formed by associative learning processes of the kind produced by neural networks. The autonomy of such systems reflects the domain-specific nature of the learning, even though the learning mechanism itself is domain-general. Dual-process theorists generally agree that System 1 processes are rapid, parallel and automatic in nature: only their final product is posted in consciousness. There is at least one contemporary research programme in which researchers are attempting to account for all reasoning results in terms of System 1 level processes. However, I shall provide substantial evidence that postulation of a second system is required.
System 2 is believed to have evolved much more recently and is thought by most theorists to be uniquely human. System 2 thinking is slow and sequential in nature and makes use of the central working memory system that has been so intensively studied in the psychology of memory. Despite its limited capacity and slower speed of operation, System 2 permits abstract hypothetical thinking that cannot be achieved by System 1. Consider the case of decision-making. We might (and frequently do) decide our actions on the basis of past experience, doing what has worked well in the past. Such intuitive decisions require little reflection. However, we can also make decisions by constructing mental models or simulations of future possibilities, a process that I term ‘hypothetical thinking’. This distinctively human facility – provided by System 2 – is of great importance.We cannot, for example, learn by experience to avoid disasters such as nuclear war or the effects of uncontrolled global warming.
(...)
Dual-process theorists claim that human beings evolved a powerful general purpose reasoning system – System 2 – at quite a late stage, and this co-exists with a much older set of autonomous sub-systems labelled as System 1. There is evidence in the archaeological record that lends credibility to this claim. In commenting on the remarkable competitive success of Homo Sapiens Sapiens over other hominids, Mithen stated, ‘This persuades many archaeologists that modern humans had…a cognitive advantage which may have resided in a more complex form of language or a quite different type of mentality… Support for the latter is readily evident in from dramatic developments that occur in the archaeological record relating to new ways of thinking and behaving by modern humans.’ (Mithen, S. (2002) "In The Cognitive Basis of Science", p. 33). Mithen comments on the qualitative change in the archaeological record c.50,000 years ago when there was sudden evidence of representational art, religious imagery and rapid adaptations in the design of tools and artefacts."
© Jonathan St.B.T. Evans
"In Two Minds: Dual-process Accounts of Reasoning" (2003)
[link]
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