"Why do people act morally – when they do? Moral philosophers and psychologists often assume that acting morally in the absence of incentives or sanctions is a product of a desire to uphold one or another moral principle (e.g., fairness). This form of motivation might be called moral integrity because the goal is to actually be moral. In a series of experiments designed to explore the nature of moral motivation, colleagues and I have found little evidence of moral integrity. We have found considerable evidence of a different form of moral motivation, moral hypocrisy. The goal of moral hypocrisy is to appear moral yet, if possible, avoid the cost of being moral. To fully reach the goal of moral hypocrisy requires self-deception, and we have found evidence of that as well. Strengthening moral integrity is difficult. Even effects of moral perspective taking – imagining yourself in the place of the other (as recommended by the Golden Rule) – appear limited, further contributing to the moral masquerade.
(...)
From the perspective of moral philosophy, the generality and abstractness of a universal moral principle like justice are major virtues. They expand our moral universe beyond narrow partialities of self-interest, kinship, friendship, and group interest.
From the perspective of moral psychology, especially the psychology of moral motivation, generality and abstractness can be an Achilles’ heel. The more general and abstract a principle is, the more vulnerable it is to rationalization. Most people are adept at moral rationalization, at justifying to themselves – if not to others – why a situation that benefits them or those they care about does notviolate their principles. ...The abstractness of most moral principles makes such rationalization especially easy. Principles may be used more reactively than proactively, more to justify or condemn action than to motivate it.
Economist Robert Frank (1988), building on biologist Robert Trivers’s (1971) ideas about reciprocal altruism, presented a similar analysis of moral motivation, but with an interesting twist. Frank argued that people are motivated to present themselves as passionately committed to moral principles in order to gain the self-benefits that the ensuing trust provides. He also argued that, due to our well-developed ability to detect deception, the effort involved in shamming this commitment is so great that the more evolutionary stable strategy is genuine commitment. Our ancient ancestors may have taken up morality lightly as part of a masquerade, but over time, natural selection favored those whose appearance of morality was genuine. Only in them was hypocrisy likely to be undetected. ...In the moral masquerade, self-deception may be an asset, making it easier to deceive others.
(...)
Intrinsic moral motivation – moral integrity – should not be equated or confused with altruistic motivation. The ultimate goal of the former is to act in accord with one or more moral principles;
the ultimate goal of the latter is to increase another’s welfare (Batson 1994). Research has documented the difference between these two distinct forms of prosocial motivation. Batson et al. (1995) found evidence that empathy-induced altruism – much like self-interested egoism – can conflict with and, at times, overpower moral motivation.
(...)
[after the moral experiment with distribution of positive & negative tasks using flipped coin]
...The appearance of morality – flipping the coin – while avoiding the cost of being moral – in spite of the result of the flip assigning self the positive consequences – provided evidence of moral hypocrisy. Had participants been motivated by moral integrity, assignment after the coin flip would have been unbiased. Those who flipped the coin rated the morality of the way they assigned the tasks considerably higher (M = 7.11) than those who did not flip the coin (M = 3.56). Even though many did not abide by the outcome of the flip, they managed to see themselves as moral (or to say they were). ...In study after study, the percentage of participants assigning themselves the positive consequences after flipping the coin (always in private) has been significantly greater than the 50% that would be expected from an unbiased coin flip, providing evidence of motivation to appear moral yet avoid the cost of being moral (i.e., moral hypocrisy). ...Thus, those with greater self-reported moral responsibility did not show signs of greater moral integrity; they showed signs of greater hypocrisy.
...Taken together, the results of these studies seem to provide considerable evidence of moral hypocrisy and very little evidence of moral integrity. The results consistently conform to the pattern we would expect if the goal of those who flipped the coin was to appear moral yet, if possible, avoid the cost of being moral. These results beg for a clearer understanding of the psychology underlying the moral hypocrisy effect.
(...)
To reach the goal of appearing moral to myself, it is sufficient that I engage in what Mele (1987) has called “ordinary self-deception,” or “desire-influenced manipulation of data” (p. 126). The goal of moral hypocrisy can be reached if I can manipulate the data so that I avoid confronting the discrepancy between my self-serving behavior and my moral standards. ...ordinary self-deception strategies that would serve moral hypocrisy can be classed into two types.
First, I could perceive my behavior as moral (i.e., as being in line with my moral standards) even though it actually is not.
Second, I could avoid comparing my behavior to my moral standards.
The first of these two strategies, if available, seems preferable because the second leaves me vulnerable to anything that might focus my attention on the behavior-standard discrepancy. If I can convince myself that I have acted morally, then my behavior can be scrutinized from the perspective of my moral standards with impunity, even pride.
(...)
[after new series of moral experiments with flipping marked coins]
...participants in Category 3, who did not flip the coin and assigned themselves to the positive consequences task, rated the morality of the way they made the task assignment decision relatively low (M = 3.89). Most important, participants in Category 4, who fiddled the coin flip and assigned themselves to the positive consequences task, rated the morality of the way they made the decision moderately high (M = 5.56), significantly higher than participants in Category 3.
(...)
Self-awareness manipulations, such as looking at one’s face in a mirror, have been found to heighten awareness of discrepancies between behavior and salient personal standards, creating pressure to act in accord with standards (Wicklund 1975). In the moral domain, for example, Diener and Wallbom (1976) induced self-awareness in research participants who had the opportunity to cheat on a test. They found that those who were self-aware cheated significantly less often than those who were not self-aware. ...However, results in the high self-awareness condition were dramatically different. Although participants who did not flip the coin were somewhat more likely to assign themselves to the positive consequences task (62%), those who flipped the coin while facing themselves in the mirror showed no bias (50% – see Rows 10 and 11 of Table 1). Reflecting the fairness of the assignment, these participants rated the morality of the way they assigned the tasks very high on the 1–9 scale (M = 8.80). The difference across the self-awareness conditions was precisely the pattern expected if making the behavior-standard discrepancy salient rendered the second type of self-deception ineffective, and forced participants to actually be moral in order to appear moral. It suggests that the second type of self-deception plays an important role in moral hypocrisy.
(...)
To actually be moral, a person should first imagine him or herself in the other’s place.
(...)
Results of these two studies suggest that an imagine-self perspective may have a limited, but still quite important, role in stimulating moral integrity. Imagining oneself in the other’s place may provide a corrective lens for the specific moral myopia to which a position of advantage is prone. The myopia of the advantaged is legendary. Those who, like Candide (Voltaire 1759/1930), live in the best of all possible worlds are not likely to trouble themselves thinking about the worlds in which others live. Those innocently born with a silver spoon in their mouth are not likely to ask whether it is morally right to keep it there. If introducing an imagine-self perspective can effectively stimulate the moral sensitivity of persons of privilege, then it has done important work.
© C. Daniel Batson
"Moral Masquerades: Experimental Exploration of the Nature of Moral Motivation" (2008)
[link]
(...)
From the perspective of moral philosophy, the generality and abstractness of a universal moral principle like justice are major virtues. They expand our moral universe beyond narrow partialities of self-interest, kinship, friendship, and group interest.
From the perspective of moral psychology, especially the psychology of moral motivation, generality and abstractness can be an Achilles’ heel. The more general and abstract a principle is, the more vulnerable it is to rationalization. Most people are adept at moral rationalization, at justifying to themselves – if not to others – why a situation that benefits them or those they care about does notviolate their principles. ...The abstractness of most moral principles makes such rationalization especially easy. Principles may be used more reactively than proactively, more to justify or condemn action than to motivate it.
Economist Robert Frank (1988), building on biologist Robert Trivers’s (1971) ideas about reciprocal altruism, presented a similar analysis of moral motivation, but with an interesting twist. Frank argued that people are motivated to present themselves as passionately committed to moral principles in order to gain the self-benefits that the ensuing trust provides. He also argued that, due to our well-developed ability to detect deception, the effort involved in shamming this commitment is so great that the more evolutionary stable strategy is genuine commitment. Our ancient ancestors may have taken up morality lightly as part of a masquerade, but over time, natural selection favored those whose appearance of morality was genuine. Only in them was hypocrisy likely to be undetected. ...In the moral masquerade, self-deception may be an asset, making it easier to deceive others.
(...)
Intrinsic moral motivation – moral integrity – should not be equated or confused with altruistic motivation. The ultimate goal of the former is to act in accord with one or more moral principles;
the ultimate goal of the latter is to increase another’s welfare (Batson 1994). Research has documented the difference between these two distinct forms of prosocial motivation. Batson et al. (1995) found evidence that empathy-induced altruism – much like self-interested egoism – can conflict with and, at times, overpower moral motivation.
(...)
[after the moral experiment with distribution of positive & negative tasks using flipped coin]
...The appearance of morality – flipping the coin – while avoiding the cost of being moral – in spite of the result of the flip assigning self the positive consequences – provided evidence of moral hypocrisy. Had participants been motivated by moral integrity, assignment after the coin flip would have been unbiased. Those who flipped the coin rated the morality of the way they assigned the tasks considerably higher (M = 7.11) than those who did not flip the coin (M = 3.56). Even though many did not abide by the outcome of the flip, they managed to see themselves as moral (or to say they were). ...In study after study, the percentage of participants assigning themselves the positive consequences after flipping the coin (always in private) has been significantly greater than the 50% that would be expected from an unbiased coin flip, providing evidence of motivation to appear moral yet avoid the cost of being moral (i.e., moral hypocrisy). ...Thus, those with greater self-reported moral responsibility did not show signs of greater moral integrity; they showed signs of greater hypocrisy.
...Taken together, the results of these studies seem to provide considerable evidence of moral hypocrisy and very little evidence of moral integrity. The results consistently conform to the pattern we would expect if the goal of those who flipped the coin was to appear moral yet, if possible, avoid the cost of being moral. These results beg for a clearer understanding of the psychology underlying the moral hypocrisy effect.
(...)
To reach the goal of appearing moral to myself, it is sufficient that I engage in what Mele (1987) has called “ordinary self-deception,” or “desire-influenced manipulation of data” (p. 126). The goal of moral hypocrisy can be reached if I can manipulate the data so that I avoid confronting the discrepancy between my self-serving behavior and my moral standards. ...ordinary self-deception strategies that would serve moral hypocrisy can be classed into two types.
First, I could perceive my behavior as moral (i.e., as being in line with my moral standards) even though it actually is not.
Second, I could avoid comparing my behavior to my moral standards.
The first of these two strategies, if available, seems preferable because the second leaves me vulnerable to anything that might focus my attention on the behavior-standard discrepancy. If I can convince myself that I have acted morally, then my behavior can be scrutinized from the perspective of my moral standards with impunity, even pride.
(...)
[after new series of moral experiments with flipping marked coins]
...participants in Category 3, who did not flip the coin and assigned themselves to the positive consequences task, rated the morality of the way they made the task assignment decision relatively low (M = 3.89). Most important, participants in Category 4, who fiddled the coin flip and assigned themselves to the positive consequences task, rated the morality of the way they made the decision moderately high (M = 5.56), significantly higher than participants in Category 3.
(...)
Self-awareness manipulations, such as looking at one’s face in a mirror, have been found to heighten awareness of discrepancies between behavior and salient personal standards, creating pressure to act in accord with standards (Wicklund 1975). In the moral domain, for example, Diener and Wallbom (1976) induced self-awareness in research participants who had the opportunity to cheat on a test. They found that those who were self-aware cheated significantly less often than those who were not self-aware. ...However, results in the high self-awareness condition were dramatically different. Although participants who did not flip the coin were somewhat more likely to assign themselves to the positive consequences task (62%), those who flipped the coin while facing themselves in the mirror showed no bias (50% – see Rows 10 and 11 of Table 1). Reflecting the fairness of the assignment, these participants rated the morality of the way they assigned the tasks very high on the 1–9 scale (M = 8.80). The difference across the self-awareness conditions was precisely the pattern expected if making the behavior-standard discrepancy salient rendered the second type of self-deception ineffective, and forced participants to actually be moral in order to appear moral. It suggests that the second type of self-deception plays an important role in moral hypocrisy.
(...)
To actually be moral, a person should first imagine him or herself in the other’s place.
(...)
Results of these two studies suggest that an imagine-self perspective may have a limited, but still quite important, role in stimulating moral integrity. Imagining oneself in the other’s place may provide a corrective lens for the specific moral myopia to which a position of advantage is prone. The myopia of the advantaged is legendary. Those who, like Candide (Voltaire 1759/1930), live in the best of all possible worlds are not likely to trouble themselves thinking about the worlds in which others live. Those innocently born with a silver spoon in their mouth are not likely to ask whether it is morally right to keep it there. If introducing an imagine-self perspective can effectively stimulate the moral sensitivity of persons of privilege, then it has done important work.
© C. Daniel Batson
"Moral Masquerades: Experimental Exploration of the Nature of Moral Motivation" (2008)
[link]
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